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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 01-4014
                              




                              
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 00-cr-00327)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 24, 2003
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge,* AMBRO and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed  November 20, 2003)
                              
OPINION OF THE COURT
                              
                                            
* Judge Scirica began his term as Chief Judge on May 4, 2003.
     1 We note that although the documents before the District Court indicate the
defendant’s name is “Todd Melvin Spears,” the pro se briefs he filed on appeal are signed
“Melvin T. Spears” and “Melvin Todd Spears.”
     2 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Having pled guilty to possession with intent to manufacture and distribute more
than 50 grams of crack cocaine, Todd Melvin Spears now seeks to appeal his sentence.1 
Spears’s attorney, Allen C. Welch, has moved to withdraw as counsel and filed an Anders
brief to support his contention that Spears’s appeal presents no nonfrivolous issues for our
review.2  Subsequent to defense counsel’s filing the Anders brief, Spears submitted a pro
se “informal brief” and reply brief.  Although Welch’s efforts were lacking, for the
reasons noted below we grant his Anders motion and affirm Spears’s sentence.
I.
A grand jury in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on December 6, 2000, indicted Spears
for distribution and possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine
base – a/k/a crack cocaine – in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  On February 12, 2001,
Spears appeared before the District Court, waived indictment, and pleaded guilty to an
information charging him with the same offense.  Spears’s plea was conditioned on his
agreement to cooperate with the Government in exchange for recommendations to the
District Court to depart downward from the maximum Sentencing Guidelines range on
the basis of Spears’s acceptance of responsibility and substantial assistance to the
     3 Despite our many admonishments of Welch, we do recognize his efforts to procure
Government cooperation in this case.
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prosecution.  The written plea agreement also provided for, inter alia , the dismissal of the
initial indictment and a stipulation that Spears possessed and distributed more than 50
grams of crack cocaine.
The presentence investigation report (PSIR) indicated Spears sold 109.35 grams of
crack cocaine, including more than 50 grams sold directly to undercover police officers
on six occasions.  Based on a total offense level of 34 and a Criminal History Category of
VI, the Guidelines sentencing range was 262 to 327 months.  An addendum to the PSIR
was filed, noting Spears’s comments to several of the PSIR’s assertions, none of which
affected the Guidelines calculations.  The Government also filed a motion stating Spears
had provided substantial assistance to the prosecution and recommending the District
Court depart downward.3  The District Court took this into account, and sentenced Spears
to 250 months imprisonment, a $2,500 fine, and $100 special assessment.
II.
The Supreme Court in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), addressed
the duties of a lawyer appointed to represent an indigent defendant when, “after a
conscientious examination” of the case, he or she determines an appeal would be “wholly
frivolous.”  Counsel “should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw,” but
“[t]hat request must . . . be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that
4might arguably support the appeal.”  Id.  More recently, the Supreme Court held “that the
Anders procedure is merely one method of satisfying the requirements of the Constitution
for indigent criminal appeals,” and each state may “craft procedures that, in terms of
policy, are superior to, or at least as good as, that in Anders.”  Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S.
259, 276 (2000).
Our Court has opted to codify the procedure suggested by Anders.  Local
Appellate Rule 109.2(a) states:
Where, upon review of the district court record, trial counsel is persuaded that
the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, trial counsel may file a
motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), which shall be served upon the appellant and the United
States.  The United States shall file a brief in response.  Appellant may also file
a brief in response pro se.  After all briefs have been filed, the clerk will refer
the case to a merits panel.  If the panel agrees that the appeal is without merit,
it will grant trial counsel’s Anders motion, and dispose of the appeal without
appointing new counsel.  If the panel finds arguable merit to the appeal, it will
discharge current counsel, appoint substitute counsel, restore the case to the
calendar, and order supplemental briefing.
Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(a).  “This rule, like the Anders case itself, provides only a
general explanation of the contours of the court’s and counsel’s obligations in the Anders
situation.”  United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000).  Indeed, we have
refined the scope of our inquiry when presented with an Anders brief to determine:
“(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled [L.A.R. 109.2(a)’s] requirements; and (2)
whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United
States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Marvin, 211 F.3d at 780). 
5Accordingly,
except in those cases in which frivolousness is patent, we will reject briefs . . .
in which counsel argue the purportedly frivolous issues aggressively without
explaining the faults in the arguments, as well as those where we are not
satisfied that counsel adequately attempted to uncover the best arguments for
his or her client.
Id. (quoting Marvin, 211 F.3d at 781).  In Marvin we rejected an Anders brief on both
grounds, 211 F.3d at 781, while in Youla we did so for the latter reason.  241 F.3d at 300. 
As in those decisions, counsel in this case does not even mention the arguments raised by
Spears’s pro se brief.
Those arguments are twofold.  Stated simply, Spears claims that the District Court
erred in aggregating the drug quantities he sold on separate occasions to arrive at a total
amount of more than 50 grams, and also that the Court erred when it stated in its plea
colloquy that Spears may be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years.  The
failure of Spears’s counsel to identify these issues includes, a fortiori, the failure to
explain why they are legally frivolous.  See Youla, 241 F.3d at 201 (quoting Marvin, 211
F.3d at 781).  “Counsel simply has not provided sufficient indicia that he thoroughly
searched the record and the law in service of his client so that we might confidently
consider only those objections raised.”  Marvin, 211 F.3d at 781.
Furthermore, the issues that Spears’s counsel did choose to include in his Anders
brief receive only cursory treatment, so skimpy it is more accurate to say their merit is not
explored.  The “summary of argument,” in its entirety, is as follows:
     4 In contrast to the effort of defense counsel, we applaud the helpful and thorough
materials filed by the Government.
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This is an Anders Brief.  There are no colorable issues that counsel identify
[sic] at any point in the history of the case.  The sentence was the result of a
negotiated plea agreement, which gave the Defendant the benefit of precluding
any further charges, while allowing for a downward departure for substantial
assistance which he received.
Anders Brief at 3.  In an approximately two-page argument section, counsel cites only one
case: the Supreme Court’s decision in Anders.  He does not mention either the section of
the United States Code under which his client was convicted or the relevant Guidelines
provisions under which Spears was sentenced.  The brief does include some citations to
the record, but the appendix does not contain the full transcript of the change of plea
hearing, as pages nine through eleven inexplicably are omitted.  This portion of the
transcript includes an exchange between the District Court and the defendant on the
figures used to compute the total amount of drugs sold – thus it is relevant to both of
Spears’s aggregation and plea colloquy arguments on appeal – and fortunately the missing
pages are submitted as an appendix to the Government’s brief.4  Indeed, the Anders brief
offers little more than counsel’s repeated (and unsupported) assertion that because
Spears’s conviction and sentence were the result of a voluntary negotiated plea
agreement, he is precluded from asserting any nonfrivolous arguments on appeal.
Again, while we recognize counsel need not include every possible claim of error
in an Anders brief, we reiterate that “the brief at a minimum must assure us that [counsel]
     5 We also note that the duties of a lawyer representing an indigent criminal defendant
on appeal are not satisfied merely by submitting an acceptable Anders brief.  In this case,
it appears that Welch’s handling of Spears’s appeal has been lackadaisical from the start. 
After Spears was sentenced on October 3, 2001, and his notice of appeal filed on October
15, 2001, this Court on January 18, 2002, granted a motion for appointment of counsel
under the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act.  Id. at 7; Docket Sheet at 4.  Also on
January 18th, we issued an order appointing Welch as CJA counsel to represent Spears
and creating deadlines for this representation.  Docket Sheet at 4.  Another order was
issued on March 6, 2002, directing Welch to show cause in writing on or before March 18
why he failed to order the transcript timely, enter his appearance on behalf of Spears, and
submit a criminal information statement.  Id.  Welch responded on March 18, 2002,
asking to be permitted to withdraw his appointment.  This request was denied on March
29, 2002, and Welch again was directed to order the transcripts, enter his appearance, and
submit a criminal information statement within 14 days.  Id. at 5.  The clerk further
informed Welch that if he failed to do so, the matter would be referred to a panel of this
Court which may direct that counsel personally appear.  Id.  Welch was instructed that if
he believed the appeal presented no issues of arguable merit, he should submit an Anders
brief, which he finally filed on August 8, 2002.  Id. at 5, 6.
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has made a sufficiently thorough evaluation of the record to conclude that no further
discussion of other areas of the case is necessary.”  Marvin, 211 F.3d at 780 (citing
United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 585, 585 (7th Cir. 1997)).5
III.
Upon an independent review of the record and legal precedent, however, we
conclude that Spears’s claims of error — aggregating quantities of crack cocaine for
sentencing purposes constitutes reversible error under United States v. Winston, 37 F.3d
235 (6th Cir. 1994), and the District Court erred in its plea colloquy by violating Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure — are without merit.
Spears signed a written plea agreement, and admitted in open court, to possessing
     6 Winston is limited to mandatory sentences imposed pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)
and does not reach those imposed under the Guidelines (which explicitly authorize
aggregation of drug quantities).  37 F.3d at 241 n.10.  In fact, the Sixth Circuit has
recently reiterated that, when a sentence imposed pursuant to the Guidelines falls between
the statutory minimum and maximum lengths, Winston is inapplicable.  See United States
v. Jernigan, 2003 WL 463483, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 18, 2003).
more than 50 grams of crack cocaine.  The sentence imposed was pursuant to the
Sentencing Guidelines.  Even assuming the permissible statutory maximum is contained
in § 841(b)(1)(B) (and not § 841(b)(1)(A)), Winston is not implicated because Spears’s
250 month sentence is less than the 40-year maximum proscribed by § 841(b)(1)(B).6 
Spears’s contention that the District Court erred in its plea colloquy is likewise based on
Winston’s bar on aggregating drug quantities.  As just stated, however, Winston does not
apply here.
* * * * *
In this context, we conclude that no issue of arguable merit exists on appeal.  We
therefore affirm Spears’s conviction and sentence and grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw. 
By the Court,
\s\ Thomas L. Ambro
Circuit Judge
